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I. INTRODUCTION
That consent may validate an otherwise wrongful military inter-
vention into the territory of the consenting state is a generally ac-
cepted principle. When a government is both widely recognized and
in effective control of most of the state, this principle affords a clear
alternative to Security Council authorization as a basis for justifying
external intervention, whether by states acting unilaterally, or by
states acting under the auspices of the United Nations (U.N.) or a re-
gional organization.
In many cases, however, consent is often a highly controversial
justification for military intervention. In some cases, it is doubtful
whether the consent at issue is voluntary In other cases, the indi-
vidual purporting to give consent may lack the legal authority to do
so. 2 But these issues, although they may prove difficult to resolve in
particular cases, are usually at least nominally susceptible to resolu-
tion under generally accepted principles of treaty law dealing with
coercion and the representation of states.3 More difficult problems
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1. As Judge (then Special Rapporteur) Roberto Ago observed in his report to the Inter-
national Law Commission on state responsibility, consent may be "expressed or tacit, explicit or
implicit, provided however that it is clearly established," and is not "vitiated by 'defects' such as
error, fraud, corruption or violence." Eighth Report on State Responsibility, Document
A/CN.4/318 and Add.1-4, 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 3,35-36 (1979).
2. To be valid, "consent ... must be internationally attributable to the State; in other
words, it must issue from a person whose will is considered, at the international level, to be the
will of the State and, in addition, the person in question must be competent to manifest that will
in the particular case involved." Id. at 36.
3. See id. ("The principles which apply to the determination of the validity of treaties also
apply with respect to the validity of consent to an action which would, in the absence of such
consent, be internationally wrongful."); John Lawrence Hargrove, Intervention by Invitation
and the Politics of the New World Order, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL
ORDER 113, 119 (L. Damrosch & D. Scheffer eds., 1991) (legal issues regarding the genuine-
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arise when the authority of a particular government purporting to
consent to intervention on behalf of the state is subject to challenge,
either because the government has lost control of a substantial por-
tion of the state, or because the government's international legiti-
macy is otherwise subject to doubt.
The theoretical basis for the rule that consent may validate an
otherwise wrongful intervention is not entirely clear. In a study of
state responsibility for wrongful conduct, the International Law
Commission concluded that consent to intervention acts as a form of
bilateral agreement between the consenting and intervening states
that suspends the normal operation of the legal rules that would oth-
erwise govern their relationship. It seems more plausible, however,
to conclude simply that consent or its absence is central to the defini-
tion of wrongful intervention in the first place. In other words, pro-
hibited intervention should be understood as intervention against the
will of the state. In Oppenheim's formulation, it is "dictatorial inter-
ference" in a state's internal affairs that is impermissible, not external
involvement per se.
Consistent with this understanding, many states have attempted
to justify military intervention in other states on the basis of consent.
In some cases, the justification was relatively persuasive, and the in-
terventions met with general acquiescence. During the Cold War
both France, and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom, relied on
consent to justify periodic interventions in former colonies to support
friendly governments against small-scale rebellions or palace coups.6
Most states accepted such interventions, even when the invitations at
ness of invitations to intervene "are resolvable on the basis of familiar concepts drawn straight-
forwardly from other areas of the law than those having to do directly with restraints on the
exercise of force, for example, the law of treaties."); see also Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969), art. 51 (rejecting the validity of consent based on
coercion of a state's representative); id. art. 52 (rejecting the validity of consent based on coer-
cion of the state itself); id. art. 7 (identifying individuals presumptively capable of expressing a
state's consent to be bound to a treaty).
4. See Roberto Ago, Eighth Report on State Responsibility, supra note 1, at 31-32.
5. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 305 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955)
(defining prohibited intervention as "dictatorial interference ... in the affairs of another State
for the purpose of maintaining or altering the actual condition of things.").
6. In 1964, Britain intervened in Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya to help incumbent
governments quell local disturbances and mutinies in the armed forces. See Louise Doswald-
Beck, The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by Invitation of the Government, 1985
BRIT.Y.B. INT'L L. 189, 189 n.4 (1986). France intervened more than a dozen times in its Afri-
can colonies, usually, though not always, to assist beleaguered governments to retain or to re-
sume control in the face of attempted military coups. See John Darnton, The World: Interven-
ing with Elan and No Regrets, N.Y. TIMES, June 26,1994, § 4, at 3.
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issue arguably came after the inviting officials had already lost their
hold on power.7 Similarly, the 1982 deployment of United States,
French, Italian and British forces to assist the Lebanese government
in restoring order met with little international opposition, at least at
the outset.'
In other cases, reliance on consent proved unpersuasive. For ex-
ample, when the Soviet Union invoked the principle of state consent
to justify invasions of Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and
Afghanistan in 1979, it met with widespread criticism on the ground
that the invitations at issue were either manufactured or coerced.9
Similarly, when the United States sent troops to the Dominican Re-
public in 1965 and to Grenada in 1983, it was condemned by many
states which questioned the legal authority of the officials who issued
the invitations to intervene. 0 Still, in these cases, as in those de-
scribed above, the principle that voluntary consent from proper state
authorities can validate intervention was not in dispute.
In most cases, the real issue was, and remains, who is entitled to
express the will of the state concerning intervention? Although it is
the consent of the state itself that is ultimately at issue, states are ab-
stract entities and cannot by themselves give or withhold consent to
intervention. In general, international law presumes that when a
government exercises effective control over the territory and people
of the state, the government (and more particularly, the authorized
7. When France intervened against an incumbent government, however, it met with more
international criticism than approbation. In 1979, when French troops forcibly deposed the
head of state of the Central African Empire, various countries criticized the French action as a
violation of the non-intervention principle, despite Bokassa's atrocious human rights record.
See W. Michael Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention and Fledgling Democracies, 18 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 794,800 (1995).
8. See Doswald-Beck, supra note 6, at 241-42. Not long after arrival, however, U.S. (and
to some extent French) forces were drawn into the conflict in a way that exceeded their status
as peacekeepers. As a result, the intervention eventually attracted considerable criticism from
other states. See id.
9. See U.N. SCOR, 14th Sess., 746th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doe. S/PV.746 (1956) (Hung.); U.N.
SCOR, 23d Sess., 1441st mtg. at 1, U.N. Doe. S/PV.1441 (1968) (Czech.); U.N. SCOR, 35th
Sess., 2185th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doe. S/PV.2185 (1980) (Afg.). The interventions were generally
deemed invalid. See Rein Mlllerson, Intervention by Invitation, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE
NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 127,128-29 (L. Damrosch & D. Scheffer eds., 1991).
10. See Doswald-Beck, supra note 6, at 228, 237 (noting that "[d]iplomatic reaction to the
[U.S.] intervention [in the Dominican Republic] was generally unfavourable" and that "the vast
majority of States, including the traditional allies of the U.S., characterized the intervention [in
Grenada] as illegal.").
11. See Quincy Wright, United States Intervention in the Lebanon, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 112,
120 (1959).
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officials of that government) possesses the exclusive authority to ex-
press the will of the state in its international affairs. 2 This presump-
tion derives from a mix of practical and theoretical considerations.
As a practical matter, states cannot ignore an effective government,
whatever its origin or political leanings. Moreover, reliance on effec-
tive control as the test for a government's capacity to represent the
state offers a reasonably objective and externally verifiable basis for
determining governmental authority, thus "inhibiting intervention"
by outside states.' As a theoretical matter, effective control serves as
a rough proxy for the existence of some degree of congruity between
the government and the larger political community of the state,
which supports the government's claim to represent the state as a
whole. To the extent that the government is unrepresentative, this
assumed congruity may be largely fictitious.'4 But it is nonetheless
widely accepted as the only viable basis on which states can conduct
international relations in a decentralized system.
In some cases, however, the presumption that the government
speaks for the state may break down. In particular, when the gov-
ernment's control over the state is effectively challenged by an inter-
nal, armed opposition, the presumption that the government repre-
sents the state may become untenable.' Indeed, it is precisely the
authority of a particular government to speak for the state as a whole
that is called into question by an internal conflict.
Arguably, the U.N. Charter prohibits aid to either government
or rebel forces in a civil war, since aid to one side might disrupt the
internal play of forces, and thereby violate the political independence
of the state and the right of its people to determine their own politi-
cal future.'" During the Cold War, however, most states acted as if
12. See, e.g., Tom J. Farer, Panama: Beyond the Charter Paradigm, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 503,
510 (1990) (noting "the virtually uniform practice in international relations of treating any
group of nationals in effective control of their state as constituting its legitimate government");
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 210 cmt. d (1985).
13. See Farer, supra note 12, at 511.
14. Cf Fernando Tes6n, Collective Humanitarian Intervention, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 323,
332 (1996) (arguing that "[a] rule requiring democratic legitimacy in the form of free adult uni-
versal suffrage seems the best approximation to actual political consent and true representa-
tiveness").
15. See generally David Wippman, Change and Continuity in Legal Justifications for Mili-
tary Intervention in Internal Conflicts, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 435 (1996)
16. See, eg., Oscar Schachter, International Law: The Right of States to Use Armed Force,
82 MicH. L. REv. 1620, 1641 (1984); John Norton Moore, Legal Standards for Intervention in
Internal Conflicts, 13 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 191, 196 (1983); see also U.N. CHARTER, art.
2(4).
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international law permitted military aid to an incumbent government,
at least when the government could plausibly claim that such aid was
needed to offset external assistance given illicitly to opposing forces."
Conversely, most states viewed aid to rebel forces as a violation of
the non-intervention principle, even if the rebels portrayed them-
selves as freedom fighters opposing a dictatorial regime. 8
Although easy to state, these general rules are often exception-
ally difficult to apply.'9 Moreover, it is not yet clear whether the end
of the Cold War will bring about any significant modifications in
these rules. Among the issues yet to be resolved are the following:
(1) the point at which an incumbent government loses its authority to
request external military assistance; (2) the extent to which the col-
lective character of an intervention may alter the applicable legal
analysis; (3) whether multiple warring factions may jointly consent to
external military intervention; (4) what happens when one or more of
those factions wishes to revoke its consent; and (5) Whether a state
may bind itself in advance to accept military intervention in specified
circumstances. These issues are considered below primarily in the
context of a regional organization contemplating intervention in a
civil conflict.
II. CONSENT AND ITS PROBLEMS
In considering the issues noted above, it may be helpful to char-
acterize invitations to intervene by the relative standing of govern-
ment and rebel forces at the time an invitation to intervene is issued.
A review of past cases suggests the following division: (1) cases in
which a recognized government exercises control over most of the
state; (2) cases in which the government and rebel forces reach a
rough equilibrium, with each in control of a substantial portion of the
state; (3) cases in which the incumbent government is merely one of
17. See Tom J. Farer, A Paradigm of Legitimate Intervention, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT.
COLLECrIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 316, 319 (L. Damrosch ed., 1993)
(during the Cold War, many states "consistently acted as if recognized governments had an un-
fettered right to seek foreign assistance in crushing domestic rivals").
18. In keeping with this view, the International Court of Justice held that U.S. aid to rebel
forces seeking to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua was illegal, noting that the principle
of nonintervention "would certainly lose its effectiveness as a principle of law if intervention
were to be justified by a mere request for assistance by an opposition group in another State."
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,126 (June 27).
19. See Mtlllerson, supra note 9, at 127 (noting that application of the rules governing pro-
vision of external assistance at the request of a government, though "perfectly clear from the
juridical point of view, is in practice nonetheless fraught with dangers from misapplication").
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several warring factions; and (4) cases in which all semblance of in-
ternal order disappears.
A. Government Control
From a legal standpoint, the simplest cases to analyze are those
in which a recognized, incumbent government controls the political
apparatus and most of the territory of the state. In such cases, the
government ordinarily retains full authority to request external assis-
tance, or even military intervention, to assist it in maintaining control
of the state.2° The government may seek such assistance from the
United Nations, from regional organizations, or from individual
states. As the International Court of Justice observed in Nicaragua v.
United States, intervention is generally "allowable... at the request
of the government of a State ....
In some respects, this position is difficult to reconcile with the
principle of self-determination. It can be argued that any govern-
ment forced to call in external military assistance to maintain itself
against internal opposition is not genuinely in a position to speak for
the state, and that the provision of such assistance by outside states
constitutes an impermissible interference with internal political proc-
esses.' Further, provision of external aid, even to the government,
runs the risk of internationalizing a previously internal conflict.
Nonetheless, most states appear to accept the authority of an effec-
tive incumbent government to invite external intervention.'
Conversely, neither states nor international organizations may
lawfully intervene against the will of an effective, incumbent govern-
ment. In Nicaragua v. United States, the International Court of Jus-
tice concluded that intervention at the request of opposition forces,
even those characterizing themselves as "freedom fighters," violated
20. See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 327
(1963); Schachter, supra note 16, at 1641-42; Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy,
in RIGHT V. MIGHr INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORE 37, 63 (2d ed. 1991). In-
deed, aid to the government in such cases does not constitute intervention in the technical
sense, since it does not amount to unlawful interference in the state's internal affairs. See
Mtlllerson, supra note 9, at 127.
21. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 126.
22. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 34447 (8th ed.
1924); Wright, supra note 11, at 121-122; Mtlllerson, supra note 9, at 132.
23. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 20, at 63 ("[U]pon authentic invitation, a state may intro-
duce military forces into the territory of another to assist the government for various purposes,
including maintaining internal order."); Farer, supra note 17, at 319.
MILITARY INTERVENTION AND HOST-STATE CONSENT
the non-intervention principle.24 For the same reason, the U.S. inva-
sion of Panama was widely condemned even though the invasion
ousted a dictatorial regime and replaced it with a democratically
elected one.'
In general, an effective government's right to seek or oppose ex-
ternal intervention does not depend on the manner in which the gov-
ernment acquired power or the manner in which the government ex-
ercises power.26 But, there are several existing or potentially
emerging exceptions to this general rule. First, a government may
not authorize external military intervention against a national libera-
tion movement opposing racist or colonial domination.27 This excep-
tion represents a specific application of the more general principle
that a state may not lawfully authorize a foreign state to take any ac-
tion that would be illegal under international law if undertaken by
the authorizing state itself.28 As the process of decolonization accel-
erated in the 1960s and 1970s, a majority of states in the United Na-
tions concluded that action against national liberation movements
constituted a violation of the principle of self-determination.29 As a
result, the usual presumption that the effective government consti-
tutes the sole representative of the state in international affairs was at
least partially reversed." Although the incumbent government could
24. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 126.
25. A large majority of the U.N. General Assembly criticized the U.S. invasion as "a fla-
grant violation of international law and of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integ-
rity of States." G.A. Res. 44/240, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No.49, 88th plen. mtg. at 52,
U.N. Doc. A/44/L.63 and Add. 1 (1989). See generally Louis Henkin, The Invasion of Panama
Under International Law: A Gross Violation, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 293 (1991); Ved
Nanda, The Validity of United States Intervention in Panama Under International Law, 84 AM.
J. INT'L L. 494 (1990).
26. See Brad R. Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy Revisited." 'Pro-Democratic' Armed In-
tervention in the Post-Bipolar World, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 481, 482 (1993).
27. See HEATHER A. WILSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY
NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS 91-136 (1988).
28. See Hargrove, supra note 3, at 116-17 (asserting that state consent cannot validate
"activities which would have been unlawful by the [consenting] state if acting alone").
29. See, e.g., Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res.
2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28,1883 of plen. mtg. at 123, U.N.
Doc. A/8082 (1970) (adopted without a vote) ("Every State has the duty to refrain from any
forcible action which deprives peoples referred to in the elaboration of the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of their right to self-determination and freedom and independ-
ence."); WILSON, supra note 27, at 99-100,135.
30. See Rein MUllerson & David J. Scheffer, Legal Regulation of the Use of Force, in
BEYOND CONFRONTATION: INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 125-26 (L.
Damrosch, G. Danilenko, & R. MtIllerson eds., 1995); W. Michael Reisman, Allocating Coin-
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continue to represent the state in most aspects of its international
relations, it could not lawfully invite external aid in suppressing the
efforts of a liberation movement to overthrow the government.3 ' To
the contrary, the liberation movement alone possessed the right to
seek external assistance, although there is considerable controversy
over whether such assistance could entail aid amounting to a use of
force. 2
Second, it is at best unclear whether a de jure government over-
thrown in violation of domestic constitutional law may authorize ex-
ternal intervention to re-establish its authority.33 The situation arises
most commonly in the case of a palace coup, that is, when a small
group of military officers engineers the abrupt and forcible ouster of
the incumbent head of state. On its face, external military interven-
tion to reinstate the ejected incumbent would seem to constitute im-
permissible interference in the state's internal affairs. Nonetheless, a
number of countries periodically send troops to help ousted leaders
return to the presidential palace. In 1964 for example, the United
Kingdom came to the aid of President Julius Nyere of Tanganyika. 4
Nyere headed an elected government that lost control of the capital
to mutinous army troops. At Nyere's request, British troops inter-
vened to restore order. The British action went largely unremarked
in the United Nations. Similarly, France has frequently intervened
militarily in its former colonies to restore de jure governments to
power following internal military coups without attracting much ad-
verse comment from other states.35
petences to Use Coercion in the Post-Cold War World.- Practices, Conditions, and Prospects, in
LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 26,32-34 (L. Damrosch & D. Scheffer
eds., 1991).
31. See generally Wilson, supra note 27, at 91-136 (discussing pertinent U.N. resolutions
and state practice).
32. See id.
33. See Domingo Acevedo, The Haitian Crisis and the OAS Response: A Test of Effective-
ness in Protecting Democracy, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT:. COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN
INTERNAL CONFLICrS 119, 139 (L. Damrosch ed., 1993) ("It is unclear... whether a de jure
government that has only formal but not actual power may invite foreign 'military intervention'
for the purpose of removing the de facto regime.").
34. See Reisman, supra note 7, at 796.
35. See Darnton, supra note 6, at 3. In 1996, French paratroopers helped the democrati-
cally elected but corrupt government of the Central African Republic force mutinous army
troops back into their barracks. Although the French intervention was highly unpopular within
the Central African Republic itself, most other states paid little attention. See Jim Hoagland,
Does Anyone Care About Africa?, DENv. POST, June 2, 1996, at F4. Some states even com-
mended the French action, including a U.S. official who praised the French intervention as
"very efficient," and who described France as a "force for stability in Africa." Gus Constan-
tine, France Keeps a Hand in Ex-Colonies: Bangui Mutiny Latest Example of Intervention,
MILITARY INTERVENTION AND HOST-STATE CONSENT
Several factors appear to account for the apparent acquiescence
of most states in actions of this nature. So long as the interventions
at issue are swift and small in scale, most states seem willing to ignore
the brief discontinuity in the de jure government's effective control of
the state. In effect, states treat the coup makers as temporary usurp-
ers whose actions do not fundamentally alter the de jure govern-
ment's power to speak for the state. This attitude may be attribut-
able in part to a general recognition that political constraints usually
preclude the U.N. Security Council from authorizing intervention in
such cases, and in part to a sense that the former colonial powers
should be allowed leeway to assist their former colonies in maintain-
ing order, even at the cost of some inconsistency with international
legal principles.
A third possible exception is a variant of the previous exception,
limited, however, to intervention to restore a democratically elected
government subjected to an unconstitutional seizure of power by in-
temal forces. The overthrow of the popularly elected government of
Haitian President Aristide presents the paradigmatic contemporary
example. Aristide became President of Haiti in 1990, following his
victory in an internationally monitored and supervised election.1
Some months later the Haitian military, alarmed by Aristide's popu-
list rhetoric and reformist policies, staged a military coup and forced
Aristide to flee the country.' Had Aristide immediately invited ex-
ternal military intervention, it might conceivably have fallen within
the second exception. Aristide, however, was reluctant to invite for-
eign military forces into Haiti. He did so, grudgingly and obliquely,
only after it became clear that months of economic sanctions and
diplomatic pressure would fail to dislodge the military junta. In any
event, Aristide's ouster was not the typical palace coup. The officers
in charge had substantial support throughout the military and also in
a significant, although minority, segment of Haitian society.39 Ac-
WASH. TIMEs, June 6,1996, at A12.
36. See Acevedo, supra note 33, at 129-30.
37. See id.
38. See Melita M. Garza, Aristide Can Only Hint He'd Like Armed Help, CHi. TRIB., June
1, 1994, § 1, at 12. Aristide's reluctance to invite intervention openly may be attributable in
part to the fact that Haitian law, reflecting unhappy prior experience with foreign intervention,
made it illegal for a Haitian government official to invite such intervention. See id.; see also
Deborah Zabarenko, Aristide Thanks U.S., Gets Assurances on Haiti, REUTER, Sept. 21, 1994
(cited in Tes6n, supra note 14, at 360 n. 150) (describing Aristide's ambivalent and shifting
views on inviting foreign intervention).
39. See Acevedo, supra note 33, at 131 (noting that "traditionally entrenched groups that
had always represented the power of wealth, privilege, and violence in Haiti-particularly the
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cordingly, the usurpers could not be summarily dismissed as transient
occupants of the Presidential palace whose ouster would have little
impact on the Haitian people's right to self-determination.
The argument in favor of permitting intervention based on an
invitation from Aristide was simple. As the elected head of state,
Aristide represented the people of Haiti as a whole. Following the
coup both the United Nations and the Organization of American
States (OAS) continued to recognize Aristide as the legitimate head
of state, and both repeatedly demanded his reinstatement.4 Ac-
cordingly, Aristide had a strong claim that he alone was entitled to
speak for the state on questions of intervention.4  By contrast, the
military junta achieved its position by force and maintained that posi-
tion by terrorizing much of the country. It had no legitimacy, domes-
tic or international, and therefore should have had no authority to
speak for the state or to oppose an intervention to restore democ-
racy.42 Intervention in this context, goes the argument, would further
Haitian self-determination and fulfill the much-heralded, but still
emerging, right to democratic governance.43
This argument is a powerful one. But, when the U.N. Security
Council finally authorized military intervention to restore Aristide to
power, it relied primarily on its authority to maintain international
peace through coercive measures under Chapter VII of the Charter.4
The authorizing resolution implicitly took note of Aristide's consent
to intervention,4 but the Security Council was evidently unwilling to
treat that consent as sufficient in and of itself to permit military ac-
upper classes and the army-viewed Aristide's popular approach as a threat"); Roth, supra
note 26, at 511-512 (noting that the "coup leadership ha[d] support in the elected legislature").
40. See, e.g., William M. Berenson, Joint Venture for the Restoration of Democracy in
Haiti: The Organization of American States and United Nations Experience: 1991-1995
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Tes6n, supra note 14, at 355-56.
41. See Roth, supra note 26, at 511-12.
42. Cf. id. (noting that Aristide's elected status and the military's "violent conduct and
unsavory history" combined to create a situation in which there-was "no contest over the man-
date to articulate the will of the 'legitimate' government").
43. As Brad Roth observed prior to the U.N. authorization of military intervention in
Haiti, "in all likelihood, fulfillment of requests for armed assistance would not in this case be
deemed a violation of international law." Id. at 511.
44. See S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940
(1994) ("[d]etermining that the situation in Haiti continues to constitute a threat to peace and
security in the region," and, "[a]cting under Chapter VII of the Charter," authorizing "Member
States... to use all necessary means to facilitate" the restoration of the Aristide government).
45. The resolution cited two letters, one from Aristide (S/1994/905, annex), and another
from Haiti's Permanent Representative to the United Nations (S/1994/910). Both letters im-
plicitly supported U.N.-authorized military intervention. Id.
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tion.' Thus, it seems clear that no right of forcible pro-democratic
intervention has yet emerged. International law continues to place
considerable importance on effective control as an indicator of a gov-
ernment's authority to act in the name of the state. 7
At the same time, however, intervention to restore or install a
democratic government is likely to receive much more sympathetic
treatment than most other forms of military intervention, at least if it
appears that the intervenors are not motivated by hegemonic or
ideological ambitions. In a number of recent cases, both interna-
tional organizations and individual states have objected vigorously to
military coups against elected governments, and have taken limited
steps to oppose such coups.4 Moreover, both the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the OAS have
pledged to take action against the unconstitutional overthrow of a
democratic government within their respective regions.49 While the
growing consensus on the importance of democratic governance has
46. In adopting Resolution 940, the Security Council considered the options outlined in
the Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Haiti, U.N. Doe.
S/19941828 (1994). In that report, the Secretary-General states that an expanded U.N. force
should operate with the consent of the legitimate authorities in Haiti, but also notes that such a
force "would have to use coercive means in order to fulfill its mandate," and that it would
therefore "be necessary for the Security Council to act under Chapter VII of the Charter in
authorizing its mandate." Id. para. 8. During the debate on Resolution 940, several states' rep-
resentatives noted that Aristide's consent to intervention was an important factor supporting
the decision to intervene, but no one identified it as either a necessary or a sufficient legal basis
for intervention. See U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg. at 17, 19, 23, 24, U.N. Doc.,
S/PV.3413 (1994) (statements of the representatives of Argentina, Spain, the Russian Federa-
tion, and the Czech Republic).
47. Thus, few states considered Endara's consent legally significant when the United
States invoked the support of Panama's President-elect, Guillermo Endara, as one of several
grounds allegedly justifying U.S. military intervention in Panama. See Abraham D. Sofaer,
Remarks, Panel on The Panamanian Revolution: Diplomacy, War and Self-Determination in
Panama, 84 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROCEEDINGS 182,183 (1990).
48. See Acevedo, supra note 33, at 141 (noting OAS criticism of "the coup in Suriname in
December 1990, the attempted coup in Venezuela in February 1992, and the so-called auto-
golpe by the constitutional president of Peru in April 1992 and of Guatemala in May 1993");
Reisman, supra note 7, at 797-98.
49. See Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of
the CSCE, 30 I.L.M. 1670, 1677 (1991) (pledging "to make democratic advances irreversible,"
and to "support vigorously" any democratic government subject to an unconstitutional over-
throw); The Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American Sys-
tem, O.A.S. General Assembly, 3d plenary sess. (adopted June 4, 1991), at 1, O.A.S. Doc.
OEA/Ser.P/XXI.O.2 (1991) (declaring democracy to be the only acceptable form of govern-
ment for the hemisphere and mandating prompt consideration of collective measures to restore
democracy in any member country subject to an illegal seizure of power); Resolution on Rep-
resentative Democracy, O.A.S. General Assembly, 5th plen. sess. (adopted June 5, 1991),
AG/RES. 1080 (XXI-0191), O.A.S. Doe. OEAJSer.P/XXI.O.2 (1991).
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not translated into acceptance of military intervention in most cases,
it does make it easier to employ non-coercive sanctions, and in rare
cases, as in Haiti, to obtain Security Council authorization for more
coercive measures.
B. Equilibrium Between the Government and Its Adversaries
In many cases of internal conflict, the Government and its adver-
saries may achieve a rough balance of power with each controlling a
significant portion of the state and its population. Juridical opinion
and state practice in such cases are varied and often contradictory.0
In theory, external assistance to either side, particularly through mili-
tary intervention, may violate the right of the people of the state to
determine the outcome of the conflict themselves.5 This theory is
problematic, since it privileges an outcome based on the relative
strength of the combatants over an outcome determined by the
popular support each faction holds or the type of regime each faction
is likely to establish should it gain full control of the state. Nonethe-
less, other approaches may be even more problematic, requiring as
they do subjective evaluations by potentially biased external actors of
the human rights credentials or democratic prospects of contenders
for power in another country.
In practice, most states continue to accord substantial deference
to the will of a recognized, incumbent government, even after it ar-
guably lost control of a substantial portion of the state, so long as the
government retains control over the capital city and does not appear
to be in imminent danger of collapse.52 In virtually all such cases,
however, it is possible for the government to allege that the opposi-
tion forces are receiving substantial external assistance from third
states in violation of the non-intervention principle. Accordingly the
government can claim a right to receive outside assistance, including
troops, as a form of counter-intervention.53 This claimed right is re-
lated to but independent of any authority the government might oth-
erwise have to consent to foreign military intervention. It rests on
the premise that aid in such circumstances is not a form of interven-
tion requiring legitimation, but rather a means to neutralize an un-
lawful, prior intervention, thus returning control over the state's po-
50. See Brownlie, supra note 20, at 326-27.
51. See, e.g., Schachter, supra note 16, at 1641; Moore, supra note 16, at 196.
52. See Doswald-Beck, supra note 6, at 197-98.
53. For a discussion of the right of counterintervention, see generally John A. Perkins, The
Right of Counterintervention, 17 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 171 (1986).
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litical future to internal actors to the extent that is possible, 4 Alter-
natively, aid may be characterized as a form of collective self-defense
against external aggression directed by third states against the state
of the requesting government.5
Unfortunately, the ease with which individual states may invoke
asserted rights of counterintervention or collective self-defense
makes it difficult to assess the relative significance of consent as an
independent justification in most instances of intervention on behalf
of embattled but still functioning incumbent governments. This is
particularly true for the many cases in which discussions of legal justi-
fication were openly colored by Cold War tensions. The 1958 U.S.
intervention in Lebanon provides a case in point. The Lebanese gov-
ernment, which was facing a substantial and growing insurrection,
alleged that the United Arab Republic was unlawfully supporting the
insurrectionists. The United States sent troops to assist the Lebanese
government, at its request. The United States, supported by other
western countries, argued that it was entirely in accordance with the
United Nations Charter to provide such assistance in the face of "an
insurrection stimulated and assisted from outside.. .,,56 The Soviet
Union, however, with support from a number of states in the General
Assembly, characterized the insurrection in Lebanon as "a popular
movement against the 'reactionary government' of the Lebanese
President, and attacked U.S. involvement as a violation of the non-
intervention principle.Y
In most such cases, it is difficult to ascertain with any certainty
the facts surrounding a government's claim that its internal armed
opposition is receiving significant external support. Even in cases
where the facts were reasonably clear, Cold War constraints and con-
cerns about intruding on a state's domestic jurisdiction typically pre-
cluded the United Nations from taking any effective action against
external intervention. As a result, states commonly acted as if in-
cumbent governments had a virtually unlimited right to obtain help51
from third states in seeking to suppress internal rebellions. With the
54. See Schachter, supra note 16, at 1642; Henkin, supra note 20, at 63-64.
55. See OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 159 (1991)
(noting that if aid to rebel forces amounts to an armed attack, a counterinterventionary re-
sponse may be an instance of legitimate collective self-defense).
56. U.N. SCOR, 13th Sess., 827th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.827 (1958); see Doswald-
Beck, supra note 6, at 214-15.
57. See Doswald-Beck, supra note 6, at 216.
58. See Farer, supra note 17, at 319.
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end of the Cold War, the members of the Security Council now peri-
odically find it possible to agree on the undesirability of external in-
tervention in particular cases. When such agreement is possible, the
Council often imposes mandatory arms embargos on all parties to the
conflict. 9 But for the most part, the Council only adopts coercive
measures when the incumbent government disappears or becomes
simply one of many warring factions." Until that point is reached,
third states continue to act as if they have a broad right to aid incum-
bent governments, provided those governments can plausibly allege
that the rebels are receiving external assistance.
Unlike individual states, however, international organizations
generally prefer not to rely on counterintervention or collective self-
defense as a justification for military intervention in internal con-
flicts. Instead, both the United Nations and regional organizations
usually proclaim that they are neutral with regard to the merits of the
underlying conflict. They strive, at least publicly, to avoid siding
openly with either the government or its opposition. In general, they
seek to play a mediating or peacekeeping function.6'
Accordingly, such organizations often face a number of prob-
lems specific to intervention under this posture. The first issue they
must confront is whose consent must be obtained for intervention.
As a prudential matter, both the United Nations and regional organi-
zations will ordinarily seek the consent of each of the primary war-
ring parties before sending troops into the middle of an internal con-
flict.62 The applicable legal requirement, however, is consent of the
territorial state. In some cases that requirement may be satisfied by
the consent of the incumbent government, even if its authority has
been substantially undermined by a significant armed rebellion. In
evaluating the incumbent government's authority in this context,
even wide-spread recognition of a government is not by itself disposi-
59. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 788, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3138th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doe. 3/REs/788
(1992) (imposing a mandatory embargo on "all deliveries of weapons and military equipment
to Liberia" except deliveries to West African peacekeeping forces); S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR,
46th Sess., 3009th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. SIRESI/13 (1991) (imposing a weapons embargo on the
former Yugoslavia).
60. See Wippman, supra note 15, at 473.
61. See, eg., Tom J. Farer, Intervention in Unnatural Humanitarian Emergencies: Lessons
of the First Phase, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 4-7 (1996); Wippman, supra note 15, at 25-26, 34-35.
62. See Lori Damrosch, Introduction, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT. COLLECTIVE IN-
TERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICrS 1, 11 (L. Damrosch ed., 1993) ("obtaining the effective
consent of all the combatants has seemed the best way to ensure that they can carry out a feasi-
ble mission.").
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tive. States and international organizations are slow to withdraw rec-
ognition from an incumbent government, even when that government
has lost control of much of the state.6 Indeed, premature withdrawal
of recognition might be seen as illicit support for the rebel forces.6
But, the failure to withdraw recognition does not automatically
translate into acceptance of the recognized government's authority to
invite external military intervention on its own behalf. As a legal
matter, whether a government is entitled to give unilateral consent to
the deployment of troops, even for peacekeeping purposes, depends
more on the extent of the government's control of the state than on
the breadth of its recognition in the international community. As
enunciated by the British Foreign Secretary, the test is whether the
regime in power "exercise[s] effective control of the territory of the
State concerned, and seem[s] likely to continue to do so."65
Again, however, the question of control is complicated by the
common existence of illicit foreign intervention. In Cyprus, for ex-
ample, the resolutions authorizing the continued deployment of U.N.
peacekeeping forces cite only the consent of the recognized Greek
Cypriot dominated Government, even though Turkish Cypriots have
long controlled more than one third of the state.66 The U.N.'s formal
reliance on government consent reflects not only the fact that the
Government still controls most of Cyprus, but also the fact that the
government would control the entire state but for Turkish military
intervention.67
In general, when a government faces substantial armed opposi-
tion, both the U.N. and regional organizations, more so than individ-
ual states, appear to have considerable leeway in determining
whether to rely on the consent of the government as a sufficient legal
basis for intervention. For example, in 1981 the Organization of Af-
63. See Doswald-Beck, supra note 6, at 197-98.
64. See 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, para. 74, at 134-37.
65. See Speech of the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington to the House of Lords,
408 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th sev.) 1121-22 (1980), cited in Doswald-Beck, supra note 6, at 194.
The Foreign Secretary was discussing Britain's decision to dispense with formal recognition in
favor of a policy that allows recognition of regimes that take power unconstitutionally to be
determined by the nature of the United Kingdom's dealings with those regimes. However, the
de facto control test he described is equally applicable to determinations of a regime's author-
ity to invite external military intervention. See Doswald-Beck, supra note 6, at 194-96.
66. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 723, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3022nd mtg., S/RES/723 (1991).
67. For a discussion of Turkish military intervention and the legal issues surrounding it,
see David Wippman, International Law and Ethnic Conflict on Cyprus, 27 TEX INT'L L.J. 1
(1995).
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rican Unity (OAU) dispatched an Inter-African Force to conduct
peacekeeping operations in Chad on the basis of a request from the
Chadian Government, even though that Government's position was
so precarious that the rebel forces overthrew the Government the
following year." Similarly, the Arab League relied on Lebanese
Government consent as the basis for intervening in that country's
civil war, even though the Government's authority in much of the
country was tenuous at best.69 In such cases most states seem willing
to defer to the judgment of the appropriate regional organization."
C. Government As Warring Faction
In some civil wars the government loses control over most of the
country, ceases to exercise any substantial administrative or govern-
mental functions, and becomes in effect simply one among a number
of warring factions. For example, President Samuel Doe's govern-
ment in Liberia lost control of most of the state to rebel forces fol-
lowing a rebellion that began on December 24, 1989.' By the sum-
mer of 1990, most government ministers had fled the country, and all
state institutions had ground to a halt. The rebels exercised military
but not administrative control over most of Liberia, with the excep-
tion of a portion of the capital still in the hands of what remained of
Doe's military.2
Liberia's neighbors watched the growing chaos with some dis-
may, fearing it might spread throughout the region. Nigeria, the
dominant regional power and a supporter of the Doe government,
pressed for regional military action to restore order in Liberia.3 Doe
welcomed the Nigerian initiative, as did Prince Johnson, the leader of
the smaller of the two rebel factions then battling Doe's forces for
control of the capital. However, Charles Taylor, the leader of the
68. See generally Amadu Sesay, The Limits of Peace-Keeping by a Regional Organization:
The OA U Peace-Keeping Force in Chad, CONFLICT Q. (Winter 1991).
69. See generally The Legal Basis of the Arab League in Lebanon, in ISTVAN POGANY,
THE ARAB LEAGUE AND PEACEKEEPING IN THE LEBANON at 93-107 (1987).
70. Some of the possible reasons for such deference are discussed at text accompanying
note 92 infra.
71. For a more detailed treatment of the Liberian civil war, see David Wippman, Enforc-
ing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT. COLLECIIVE
INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CoNFLICTs 157 (L. Damrosch ed., 1991).
72. See id. at 158.
73. See Anthony Chukwukaa Ofodile, The Legality of ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia,
32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 381,383-84 (1994).
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main rebel force, strongly opposed external intervention.' Taylor
believed that given time his forces could take control of the entire
state, and that any regional intervention led by Nigeria would support
the failing Doe regime at Taylor's expense.
Although Liberia's U.N. representative sought to place the Libe-
rian crisis on the Security Council's agenda, the Council took no ac-
tion.76 In August 1990, five states, operating under the auspices of the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), sent sev-
eral thousand troops into Monrovia. The troops were instructed to
act as a peacekeeping force, to the extent possible. In keeping with
this ostensible mission, the "peacekeepers" were designated as the
Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG).' Taylor did not view ECOMOG as a neutral
peacekeeping force, however, and his forces attacked ECOMOG on
its arrival. ECOMOG then launched a military offensive to expel
Taylor's forces from Monrovia and to secure the capital.
This action and subsequent offensives against Taylor's forces are
not easy to reconcile with international law. ECOWAS did not have
Security Council authorization when it sent troops into Liberia. It
did not have the consent of the dominant warring faction, which
stated in advance that it would treat an ECOWAS military interven-
tion as an illegal foreign invasion. Thus, this was not a classic
peacekeeping operation in which the intervening force obtains the
advance consent of the primary warring parties.
At least one author, Professor Georg Nolte, has argued force-
fully that President Doe's consent to the intervention was sufficient
legal authority for it." Nolte contends that it is "irrelevant" that Doe
had been reduced to a "minor contender for power" at the time he
gave his consent to the intervention.' His government was still the
recognized government of Liberia, and was "capable, by agreeing to a
cease-fire with an otherwise rival faction, of paving the way for entry
74. See Wippman, supra note 15, at 167; Ofodile, supra note 73, at 384-85.
75. See U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., 27th mtg. at 61, U.N. Doc. A/45/PV. 27 (1990).
76. See U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., 27th mtg. at 61, U.N. Doc. A/45/PV.27 (1990); U.N.
SCOR, 2974 mtg. at 3, U.N. Doe. S/PV. 2974 (1991).
77. See Wippman, supra note 15, at 167-68.
78. See id. at 168-69.
79. Georg Nolte, Restoring Peace by Regional Action: International Legal Aspects of the
Liberian Conflict, 53 ZErrScHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLIcmES RECHT UND
VOLKKERRECHT 603 (1993).
80. Id. at 625.
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of the intervention forces into his country."81 Nolte recognizes that
such a rule, allowing an essentially defunct government to invite ex-
ternal military intervention to prevent an adversary from taking
power, might be abused by neighboring states with hegemonic aspira-
tions, and might lead to an internationalization of a domestic conflict.
Nolte argues, however, that the regional framework for intervention
provides "the necessary degree of impartiality and the chance of con-
tainment of the conflict," and that in situations comparable to Libe-
ria's, it is necessary to balance the goals served by the non-
intervention principle with the need to further humanitarian aims.2
Thus, Nolte's position is that Doe's consent was sufficient legal
justification for regional intervention in Liberia, especially in light of
the humanitarian aims of that intervention. This position is logically
consistent with the Security Council's reaction to the ECOWAS in-
tervention. Although the Council never formally authorized military
action, months after the initial intervention it did issue statements
commending ECOWAS for its efforts to restore peace in LiberiaY.
Since the conventional view is that only prior authorization will suf-
fice to legitimize a regional enforcement action, the Council's post
hoc approval suggests that the Council considered the ECOWAS in-
tervention to be a consent-based peacekeeping operation. Moreover,
during debate on a later resolution authorizing sanctions against
Taylor's forces, various members of the Council expressly character-
ized ECOMOG as a "peacekeeping force."'' Since peacekeeping, by
definition, is an operation undertaken with the consent of the territo-
rial state, and since Taylor did not consent, one could read this char-
acterization of ECOMOG as an implicit claim that Doe acting alone
had the legal authority to consent to ECOMOG's deployment.
Nonetheless, it is difficult to conclude from the facts of this case
that a government, reduced to the status of one among several war-
ring parties, can unilaterally consent to an external intervention, even
when the intervention is carried out under the auspices of a regional
or subregional organization. ECOWAS itself did not cite Doe's con-
81. Id.
82. Id. at 623-24.
83. See Note by the President of the Security Council, S/22133, January 22, 1991; Note by
the President of the Security Council, S/23886, May 7,1992.
84. See generally Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand
One Hundred and Thirty-eighth Meeting, SIPV.3138, November 19, 1992; Wippman, supra
note 15, at 185.
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sent as a legal basis for intervention,8 nor did individual states.
Given the abysmal nature of the Doe regime, the breadth of opposi-
tion to it throughout the country, and the personal ties between Doe
and the Nigerian President, reliance on Doe's consent would have
been politically intolerable. It would also have run contrary to
ECOMOG's claim to be a neutral interposition force. That claim
was never entirely credible, since ECOMOG from the start was
forced into an adversarial posture with Charles Taylor. But even
though ECOMOG intervened against Taylor, it did not intervene for
Doe. It made no effort to restore Doe to power. Instead,
ECOMOG, and ECOWAS more generally, sought from the outset to
arrange internationally monitored elections as the basis for resolving
the conflict, and deliberately excluded Doe as a possible candidate in
such elections." Indeed, it was precisely because ECOWAS pursued
a strategy of national reconciliation through democratic elections that
the intervention attracted international support.
By itself, this does not mean that ECOWAS could not rely on
Doe's consent as the legal basis for interventionY When the United
Nations first intervened in the Congo, it relied in large part on the
beleaguered government's consent, even though the U.N. claimed to
be neutral as between the internal warring factions.H But in the
Congo, as in other cases where a multinational interven!tion force re-
lied on a teetering government's consent, an illicit prior intervention
(in that case by Belgium) arguably justified external aid to the gov-
ernmentY. A similar argument could have been made in Liberia
since Taylor received substantial support from Libya, Burkina Faso,
and C6te d'IvoireY0 But ECOWAS chose not to take that position,
preferring to rely instead on a humanitarian justification.
Overall, there are good reasons why Doe's consent should be
deemed insufficient as a legal justification. Unlike Aristide, Doe
lacked the legitimacy that comes with the acquisition of power
through internationally monitored elections. Accordingly, once Doe
85. In fact, ECOWAS stressed that its intervention was not designed "to save one part."
See U.N. SCOR, Annex 1, at 3, U.N. Doc. S/21485 (1990).
86. See Christopher J. Borgen, The Theory and Practice of Regional Organization Inter-
vention in Civil Wars, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & Po. 797,817 (1994).
87. See Nolte, supra note 79, at 626.
88. See S.C. Res. 143, U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 873d mtg., U.N. Doe. S/4387 (1960).
89. For a brief description of events in the Congo, see THOMAS M. FRANCK, NATION
AGAINST NATION: WHAT HAPPENED TO THE U.N. DREAM AND WHAT THE U.S. CAN Do
ABOUT IT 174-77 (1985).
90. See Wippman, supra note 15, at 188.
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was effectively reduced from head of state to head of a minor warring
faction, his authority to speak for the state was nominal and purely
formal. Doe's authority rested on the tenuous prop of external rec-
ognition. Though not withdrawn, such recognition says little in this
context about outside states' views of Doe's authority, and nothing at
all about the relationship between effective control and political
community that normally underpins a government's claim in interna-
tional law to be able to invite intervention on behalf of the state.
In the end, Doe's invitation adds only a thin patina of legitimacy
to the force of the humanitarian arguments for intervention.9' If
those arguments are not sufficient in and of themselves to warrant in-
tervention, it is difficult to conclude, as a matter of law or policy, that
the invitation of one faction, even if it is the faction that previously
controlled the government, should materially alter the legal calculus.
This is not to say that regional organizations should not have a
substantial margin of appreciation when determining whether a gov-
ernment's political and military position has.deteriorated to the point
that it no longer possesses sufficient authority to invite outside inter-
vention. States typically do, and should, accord substantial deference
to judgments by regional organizations with regard to the standing of
a particular government within their region. There are several rea-
sons why such deference is appropriate. First, as noted earlier, the
process of multilateral decision-making, which requires achievement
of a consensus among states with diverse interests, acts as a screen for
purely self-interested interventions. Second, the member states of
regional organizations have assented, at least to some degree, to the
decision-making procedures at issue. Third, the member states are
likely to have a greater expertise on the issues driving the conflict and
greater familiarity with the warring parties than extra-regional actors.
Regional organizations may thus be in a better position to evaluate
and choose among available courses of action than states operating
from a greater cultural and political distance.
There are, of course, some countervailing considerations. In
particular, the very proximity that affords regional organizations a
better understanding of local conditions than more distant states may
also generate a greater degree of bias or self-interest than might be
expected in other states. Moreover, it is possible in particular cases
91. Accord Borgen, supra note 86, at 818 ("Since ECOWAS marginalized the Doe gov-
ernment and forged a future for Liberia that did not envision Doe at all, the legitimacy of its
action cannot be argued to be based on the consent of the parties.").
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that a regional organization may simply act as a vehicle to conceal the
driving interests of the organization's most powerful state. Most im-
portant, regional organizations typically lack the will, the resources,
or both to intervene effectively in large-scale internal conflicts. 2
The dangers of biased or hegemonic interventions are real, but
they are probably less significant now than during the Cold War
when the United States undermined the perceived utility of regional
collective decision making processes through its efforts to use the
OAS (and on one occasion, the Organization of Eastern Caribbean
States) as vehicles to legitimize ideologically motivated interventions
in Latin America and the Caribbean.93 Moreover, these dangers can
be mitigated through careful U.N. oversight of regional interven-
tions.9' The larger problem is one of capabilities. Only a few sub-
global organizations, NATO in particular, have the logistical and fi-
nancial capacity to conduct effective large-scale military operations
in distant countries. But the member states in those organizations
seldom see a vital national interest at stake in contemporary internal
conflicts, and thus lack the will to engage in the sustained
peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding measures
needed to stabilize war-torn countries. Fears of regional instability
and weaker structures of public accountability may give smaller re-
gional and subregional organizations (such as ECOWAS) the politi-
cal will to intervene in internal conflicts, and an ability to take casual-
ties well past the point that would drive out less motivated
intervenors. But such organizations seldom have the resources, expe-
rience, or credibility with the warring parties to intervene effec-
tively.95
The obvious response to this dilemma is for the better endowed
international organizations to assist the weaker but more motivated
92. See Jeffrey Laurenti, The Regionals and the U.N.: Keystone Cops?, Address at the
conference on "The United Nations, Regional Organizations, and Military Operations" hosted
by the Center on Law, Ethics, and National Security, Duke University School of Law, April 12-
13,1996 (on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law).
93. See g., Farer, supra note 17, at 333-35.
94. The United Nations dispatched peacekeepers to Liberia in part because of concerns
over the neutrality of ECOWAS forces. See S.C. Res. 866, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3281st mtg.
at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/866 (1993); Binaifer Nowrojee, Recent Developments: Joining Forces:
United Nations and Regional Peacekeeping-Lessons from Liberia, 8 HARv. HUM. Rrs. J. 129
(1995). The United Nations has also sent peacekeepers to the Caucasus, in part to keep watch
over peacekeeping actions conducted by forces from the Commonwealth of Independent
States. See James Meek, Peacekeeping: U.N. Rules Out Special Status for Russians, THE
GUARDIAN (Manchester, Eng.), April 5,1994, at 9.
95. See Laurenti, supra note 92.
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regional organizations to intervene constructively. That approach
has been attempted in various conflicts. In Liberia, for example, the
United Nations and individual states have provided various forms of
assistance to ECOWAS, while leaving to ECOWAS the dominant
role in attempting to establish peace. To date, the support given to
ECOWAS has been far less than the organization needed to compen-
sate for its own limited resources. 6 But as the international commu-
nity acquires more experience in ending internal conflicts using coor-
dinated efforts by various international organizations, the record in
this area may improve.
On balance, it seems appropriate as a legal matter to continue to
accord regional organizations a reasonable margin of appreciation in
evaluating the authority of particular governments to invite interven-
tion in close cases. Even so, justifications other than governmental
consent should be sought when no single faction can credibly claim to
speak for the state. One possibility, of course, is consent from all of
the principal warring factions. To the extent that international law
treats control of the state as a sufficient basis for expressing the
state's consent to external military intervention, it seems reasonable
to conclude that the collective consent of the various warring fac-
tions, which together control the state as a whole, constitutes the best
available alternative to consent by a recognized, effective govern-
ment.9 In many cases, it may be politically or morally unattractive to
accord substantial legal significance to the will of one or more faction
leaders, particularly if such leaders command no significant popular
allegiance, rule by terror, and exercise no real governmental func-
tions in their areas of military predominance." Unfortunately, exter-
nal actors wishing to end a protracted and bloody internal conflict of-
ten have no choice but to accept such leaders as speaking for the
territory and population under their control.99
96. See Nowrojee, supra note 94, at 147-48.
97. See ANN VAN WYNEN THOMAS & A. J. THOMAS, JR., NON-INTERVENTION: THE LAW
AND ITS IMPORT IN THE AMERICAS 215, 221 (1956) (if all parties to an internal struggle request
intervention, "the legality of the intervention would then be based upon the total consent of the
state").
98. See David Wippman, Treaty-Based Intervention: Who Can Say No?, 62 U. CHI. L.
REv. 607, 657 (1995).
99. See, e.g., Statement of Roy S. Lee, 28 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 643 (1995) ("Essentially
you have to negotiate with somebody in power.").
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D. Collapse of Internal Authority
In some cases, conflict reaches a level of intensity in which the
forces of the incumbent government are routed, and no other internal
source of authority exercises any meaningful administrative or gov-
ernmental functions. It is doubtful that this situation presents a sig-
nificantly different legal posture than a situation in which the gov-
ernment becomes simply one among a number of warring factions.
Some authors have suggested, however, that in a situation of com-
plete breakdown of internal authority, regional organizations have a
special competence to intervene to restore order.1"
It could be argued that in such a case military action by a re-
gional organization to restore order falls within the bounds of re-
gional authority to deal with problems "appropriate for regional ac-
tion" pursuant to Chapter VIII of the Charter."1 Absent any viable
internal authority, the argument goes, intervention designed to re-
store conditions under which the population of the state can establish
a government of its choosing would not be action against a state, and
so would not constitute enforcement action of the sort that would
have to be authorized by the Security Council pursuant to Article 53
of the Charter.'0 Accordingly, consent in such cases might be treated
as unnecessary. Alternatively, consent in such cases might be pre-
sumed. Under this approach, the assumption would be that interven-
tion in such circumstances would be so clearly in the interest of the
affected state that the state, or the people of the state, would cer-
tainly consent to such intervention if they could.0 3 Either way, inter-
ventions to restore order could be deemed to fall within the gray area
between Article 52's peaceful dispute resolution mechanisms and Ar-
ticle 53's enforcement action.
A variation on this argument would be that in a situation of
complete internal breakdown, the highest surviving official of the
100. See John Norton Moore, Grenada and the International Double Standard, 78 AM. J.
INT'L L. 145, 154-56 (1984) ("there is substantial authority that regional peacekeeping actions
undertaken in a setting of breakdown of authority are lawful under the Charter."); see also 20
U.N. SCOR, 1220th mtg. at 15, 16-17, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1220 (1965); 20 U.N. SCOR, 122d mtg.
at 3,4-5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1222 (1965) (statements of U.S. Ambassadors Stevenson and Yost).
101. Article 52 of the U.N. Charter provides: "Nothing in the present Charter precludes the
existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the
maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, pro-
vided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes
and Principles of the United Nations."
102. See Moore, supra note 100, at 154.
103. See Ago, supra note 1, at 36.
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vanished government should have the authority to invite external in-
tervention to restore order."' This situation arguably differs from the
situation where a government's status is reduced to one of several
warring factions, because the surviving official supposedly speaks
against a background of anarchy rather than as the representative of
one of several factions each claiming the right to speak for the state.
The United States invoked both variations of the argument in
support of its 1983 invasion of Grenada. The United States claimed
that anarchy reigned at the moment of intervention, and that swift ac-
tion was necessary to restore order and to protect U.S. nationals resi-
dent in Grenada.' 5 To support its decision, the United States in-
voked, inter alia, the authorization of the Organization of Eastern
Caribbean States, claiming that it had authority under Chapter VIII
of the U.N. Charter to respond to disorder in a member state. ' The
United States also relied on an invitation to intervene issued by the
Governor-General of Grenada. 7 Even though the Governor-
General's authority within Grenada was largely ceremonial,' 8 the
United States argued that his consent carried substantial weight in
the absence of colorable claims by other internal actors to speak for
the state. However, neither of these justifications, either individually
or in tandem with the alleged threat to U.S. nationals, proved persua-
sive to most states.09
The notion that states may intervene to substitute an orderly
democratic process for anarchic violence as a means to reorder a
state's internal political structures is an attractive one, at least on the
surface. In theory, an intervention of that sort, if effective and ac-
complished at a reasonable cost to the affected state, could only
benefit the people of that state.' Under the conventional under-
104. See Moore, supra note 100, at 153 n. 26, 159-61 (arguing that the Governor-General of
Grenada had more authority to speak for Grenada than any other official at the time of the
U.S. invasion of Grenada).
105. See Statement of the Honorable Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy Secretary of State, before
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives 2 (Nov. 2,1983), reprinted in
78 AM. J. INT'L L. 200,200-02 (1984).
106. See id. at 203.
107. See icL
108. See Christopher Joyner, The United States Action in Grenada: Reflections on the Law-
fulness of Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'LL. 131,139 (1984).
109. The U.S. invasion was condemned by a substantial majority of the U.N. General As-
sembly. See G.A. Res. 38/7, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., Supp. No. 47, U.N. Doc. A/38/47 (1983).
110. See, eg., Malvina Halberstam, The Copenhagen Document: Intervention in Support of
Democracy, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 163, 167 (1993) (arguing that pro-democratic intervention is
not against "but in support of the 'territorial integrity' and 'political independence' of a state");
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standing of the U.N. Charter, however, any uninvited military inter-
vention that is not undertaken in self-defense or authorized by the
Security Council is illegal."1 Moreover, the risks of abuse associated
with a broad license to restore order are substantial, since there will
often be a significant, though temporary, vacuum of authority be-
tween the overthrow of the incumbent government and the estab-
lishment of a successor government.
It might be appropriate, however, to create an exception for
cases of protracted anarchy, in which all government functions cease
for an extended period, and the warring factions are unable or un-
willing to exercise any administrative functions even within the terri-
tory they control."' Possession of a government is an element and
arguably a duty of statehood."3 The temporary absence of a govern-
ment cannot by itself suffice to trigger intervention, because internal
actors must be given some opportunity to reestablish order on their
own terms."4 At some point, however, the prolonged absence of any
government may constitute an abdication of the responsibilities of
statehood sufficient to warrant external intervention designed to en-
able the citizens of the state to resume control over their affairs, and
to put an end to destructive and pointless conflict. 5
One problem, of course, is determining when that point is
reached. The Security Council can decide at any time that the effects
of anarchy are intolerable and authorize military intervention simply
by finding that the "magnitude of the human tragedy" created by
such conditions constitutes a threat to international peace. That, af-
Anthony D'Amato, The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny, 84 AM. J.
INT'L L. 516 (1990); W. Michael Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Char-
ter Article 2(4), 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 642, 644-45 (1984) (The critical question in a decentralized
system is not whether coercion has been applied, but whether it was applied in support of or
against community order and basic policies....").
111. See generally Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGrr V. MIGir.
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 37 (2d ed. 1991).
112. See THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 97, at 220-21.
113. See id. at 220 ("It is the duty of a population to provide itself with a government."); see
also 1 RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 201 cmt. f, at 73 (1987)
("A state need not have any particular form of government, but there must be some authority
exercising governmental functions and able to represent the entity in international affairs.").
114. See THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 97, at 220-21.
115. See id. at 221 ("[lin the event a nation falls into anarchy, intervention is legal only
where there is a prolonged entire absence of government."). But see Francis Boyle, et al., In-
ternational Lawlessness in Grenada, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 173 (1984) ("Even when it actually
exists, chronic disorder in a country does not permit neighboring states to intervene for the
purpose of reestablishing minimum public security, let alone imposing a democratic form of
government.").
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ter all, was the basis for the U.N. authorized military intervention in
Somalia."6
The question is whether regional organizations should have a
similar margin of appreciation, either under a theory of presumed
consent, or under the view that action to restore order in such cases
does not constitute enforcement action under Chapter VIII of the
U.N. Charter. Acceptance of a presumed consent theory, unless
based on the terms of a regional organization's charter or some other
treaty arrangement, would necessarily validate a similar intervention
by a state acting unilaterally. That is a dangerous prospect since de-
cisions by individual states are not subject to the checks and balances
of a collective decision-making process." Accordingly, it seems bet-
ter to conclude that such interventions, to the extent they are permis-
sible at all without Security Council authorization, fall within the
bounds of appropriate action by a regional organization.
III. CONSENT AND ITS REVOCATION
What happens when a state consents to intervention and then
withdraws that consent? In the ordinary case, the answer is simple.
Intervention by consent must remain within the bounds of that con-
sent. Accordingly, if a generally effective incumbent government re-
vokes its prior consent to an external military intervention, the inter-
venors must withdraw.1"8 Failure to do s6 amounts to an intervention
against the will of the state.
There are circumstances, however, in which a different result
might be reached. First, there is some uncertainty about the condi-
tions under which even an effective government can lawfully revoke
consent to the deployment of an international peacekeeping force. In
1967, Egypt withdrew its consent to the presence of the United Na-
tions Emergency Force on Egyptian territory, thus paving the way for
an Egyptian attack on Israel."9 The Secretary-General, after studying
the legal aspects of the Egyptian position, concluded that the United
Nations had no legal option but to withdraw. In his view, the de-
ployment of peacekeepers required the continuous affirmative con-
sent, or at least acquiescence, of the state in which the troops were
116. See S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3145th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/794 (1992).
117. See Ago, supra note 1, at 36 (arguing against acceptance of a theory of presumed con-
sent on the ground that "cases of abuse would be too common").
118. For examples, see id. at 32-33.
119. See FRANCK, supra note 89, at 87-88; STEVEN R. RATNER, THE NEw U.N.
PEACEKEEPING: BUILDING PEACE IN LANDS OF CONFLICr AFTER THE COLD WAR 38 (1995).
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placed. '
The Secretary-General's decision provoked considerable contro-
versy.' Some critics felt that Egypt's consent to the deployment, and
its acceptance of a status of forces agreement with the U.N., created a
legal obligation to permit the force to carry out its mission in accor-
dance with the parties' prior agreement." ' To confer on any state the
right to force a unilateral withdrawal of international peacekeepers at
any time could stimulate strategic behavior, permitting one party to
use peacekeepers as a means to buy time until that party is ready to
resume a conflict previously suspended by agreement between the
warring parties. On the other hand, deployment of military forces in
a state's territory without its actual, contemporaneous consent im-
pinges so directly on the autonomy of the state that the state pre-
sumably must retain, by virtue of its sovereignty, the right ultimately
to revoke its consent and to force the intervenors to withdraw. The
solution to this particular dilemma may lie in simply reading a re-
quirement of reasonable notice into a state's right to revoke consent,
thus giving all parties time to prepare for the peacekeepers' depar-
ture.
A similar problem arises when consent to intervention comes
from two or more warring factions in an internal conflict, rather than
from an effective government acting unilaterally. In such cases,
states can reasonably rely on the consent of the various factions as
collectively constituting the state's consent. 13 Unfortunately, consent
obtained in such fashion is often fragile." Almost inevitably, one
faction may come to believe that the presence of external forces
benefits the other side, even if the forces act as neutral peacekeepers.
At that point, the faction perceiving itself as disadvantaged by inter-
vention may withdraw consent, and even attack the would-be
peacekeepers. Clearly, the peacekeepers have the right to defend
themselves, but do they have the right to pursue their mission against
120. FRANCK, supra note 89, at 88-91; RATNER, supra note 119, at 38.
121. See FRANCK, supra note 89, at 88-93; RATNER, supra note 119, at 38.
122. In a 1957 Aide Memoire, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjdld recorded his under-
standing that Egypt had agreed to constrain its right to revoke consent to the deployment of
UNEF. According to Hammarskjold, Egypt agreed that UNEF could stay until its mission was
completed, as determined by both Egypt and the U.N. See Aide Memoire, reprinted in 6 I.L.M.
595 (1967).
123. See THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 97, at 215,221.
124. See RATNER, supra note 119, at 38-41 (analyzing problems with "decaying" consent in
international peacekeeping operations).
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internal opposition?H
If one assumes that any coercive actions and even the continued
presence of the peacekeepers requires either the contemporaneous
consent of the state as a whole or Security Council authorization,
then withdrawal of consent even by one among a number of factions
may amount to the termination of consent as a legal basis for inter-
vention." But if one assumes that the withdrawal of consent is as
much an act of state will as the grant of consent in the first place, one
could argue that revocation requires a collective decision, and that no
single faction is entitled to revoke consent unilaterally.
Even if one follows the latter approach, however, consent may
still prove to be a dubious basis for intervention, since some of the
factions that gave their consent originally may splinter, disappear, or
be replaced by new factions. On occasion, factions may reconstitute
themselves under new names, precisely in order to escape any obliga-
tions they may previously have assumed. At some point, the contin-
ued presence of external forces will ordinarily require either renewed
consent emanating from the new constellation of warring factions or
Security Council authorization."
When consent broke down as a basis for intervention in Somalia,
the Security Council switched to enforcement action under Chapter
VII." It did the same in the former Yugoslavia.2 9 By contrast, the
consent of various warring factions to ECOWAS peacekeeping in Li-
beria has come and gone with some frequency over the last six years.
Nonetheless, ECOWAS acts as if it has always had full consent, with
125. See OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 408 (1991)
(noting that U.N peacekeepers sometimes "stretch" the self-defense principle "far beyond its
usual legal meaning," in part by combining a right to freedom of movement with a claimed
"right to use arms in defense of positions occupied").
126. In many cases, parties dissatisfied with the activities of peacekeeping forces may sim-
ply engage in obstructionist tactics rather than explicitly withdraw consent. See RATNER, supra
note 119, at 38. In such cases, peacekeepers may be forced to consider not simply the technical
existence of consent, but also the "quality" of that consent, that is, the extent to which the prin-
cipal parties to the conflict can be considered on balance committed to the peacekeeping proc-
ess. See Id. at 39-41.
127. Cf. RATNER, supra note 119, at 39 (arguing that the United Nations cannot force par-
ties to comply with a peacekeeping agreement without impermissibly blurring the distinction
between peacekeeping and enforcement).
128. See Lee, supra note 99, at 643; Jeffrey Clark, Debacle in Somalia: Failure of the Collec-
tive Response, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT. COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL
CONFLICrS 205, 221-23 (1993).
129. See James B. Steinberg, International Involvement in the Yugoslavia Conflict, in
ENFORCING RESTRAINT. COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 27, 50-55
(1993).
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the apparent blessing of the United Nations. In the end, this may be
yet another area in which both the United Nations and regional or-
ganizations should be deemed to have a considerable margin for ap-
predation, that is, some leeway to decide whether a single faction's
withdrawal of consent by itself fatally undermines the authority of
the operation as a whole."3
Finally, there is considerable uncertainty over whether and un-
der what conditions states may authorize external military interven-
tion by treaty, even in the absence of any contemporaneous consent
to the intervention." The issue is particularly intriguing as it relates
to the intervention authority possessed by regional organizations or
ad hoc coalitions of states. In a series of thoughtful articles, Professor
Tom Farer urges us to consider the following hypothetical. Suppose
that a group of democratic states in the Caribbean enters into a treaty
with interested NATO members to protect democracy in the signa-
tory states. In the event of an unconstitutional seizure of power in
any one of those states, the other parties to the treaty are authorized
to intervene militarily to restore the elected government, either at the
request of the ousted elected officials, or by a two-thirds vote if
communication with those officials proves impossible. Professor
Farer's conclusion is that an intervention carried out pursuant to such
a treaty would be lawful "[s]ince such an action is carried out with the
previously expressed consent of the target state."'
It could be argued, of course, that only the contemporaneous
consent of the effective government can satisfy the peremptory norm
against the use of force in international relations embodied in Article
2(4) of the U.N. Charter. But if the forces seizing power unconstitu-
tionally have not yet consolidated their control over the country, or
if, as in Haiti, the international community continues to recognize the
former government as the legitimate state government, it seems fair
130. Cf. RATNER, supra note 119, at 40-41 (noting that in many cases of "decaying con-
sent", states "neither insist upon enforcement authority from the Security Council to respond
to many types of violations nor demand the termination of missions facing lack of compi-
ance").
131. For a more detailed treatment of this subject, see Wippman, supra note 71, at 187-89.
132. Farer, supra note 17, at 332; see also Tom J. Farer, The United States as Guarantor of
Democracy in the Caribbean Basin: Is There a Legal Way?, 10 HUM. RTS. Q. 157 (1988). For
similar proposals, see Morton H. Halperin, Guaranteeing Democracy, 91 FOREIGN POL'Y 105,
121 (1993) (urging adoption of an "international guarantee" clause permitting forcible inter-
vention to protect democracy upon "consensus of a group of guaranteeing powers designated in
an agreement with a particular country"); Halberstam, supra note 110 (arguing that the Co-
penhagen Document can be construed to permit military intervention to protect democracy).
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to conclude that the usurpers acting alone should not be entitled to
revoke the state's prior consent to intervention.
The question Professor Farer poses is not entirely hypothetical.
A number of recent agreements designed to end protracted civil wars
have come very close to authorizing outside states to employ force
against any party that violates the agreement.133 It is too soon to tell,
however, whether in the future such agreements might serve as a use-
ful adjunct to existing legal mechanisms for the use of force in inter-
nal conflicts.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite its apparent simplicity, the principle that a state may
validly consent to external military intervention turns out in practice
to be fraught with difficulty. Once we move beyond the paradigm
case of a recognized and effective government inviting intervention
for sharply limited ends, it is extremely difficult to define precisely
the cases in which invited interventions will be generally accepted.
Previous state practice in this area is of only limited utility, since in
most cases the reaction of states was strongly colored by Cold War
considerations.
Nonetheless, it may be possible to offer a few generalizations,
none of which are likely to prove surprising. In keeping with the tra-
ditional approach to intervention in internal conflicts, most states are
strongly influenced by the extent to which an inviting authority exer-
cises control of the state at the time an invitation to intervene is is-
sued. Increasingly, however, states are prepared to consider the
democratic legitimacy of an inviting authority as a counterbalance to
considerations of power and effective control. Finally, in close cases,
133. See, e.g., Cotonou Agreement (July 25, 1993), art. 8, § 3, attached to Letter Dated 6
August 1993 from the Charg6 d'Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of Benin to the United
Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General 7, U.N. Doc. S/26272 (1993), reprinted in
REGIONAL PEACE-KEEPING AND INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT. THE LIBERIAN CRISIS 343,
347 (Marc Weller ed., 1994) (authorizing ECOMOG to "resort to the use of its peace-
enforcement powers" against violators of the agreement under specificed circumstances);
Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict (October 30,
1991), art. 6, attached to Letter Dated 30 October 1991 from the Permanent Representatives of
France and Indonesia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General 10, U.N. Doc.
A146/608, S/23177 (1991), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 180, 184 (1992) (delegating to the U.N. "all
powers necessary to ensure the implementation of this Agreement"); General Framework for
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (December 14, 1995), Annex I, Art. 1, reprinted in 35 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 75, 92 (1996) (inviting the U.N. Security Council to establish a multina-
tional military Implementation Force authorized to undertake "such enforcement action.., as
may be necessary to ensure implementation" of the parties' agreement).
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states are likely to defer to the judgment of regional organizations, at
least in those cases in which the United Nations itself is reluctant to
get involved.

